Critical Minerals and National Security

The connection between critical minerals and national security is direct, consequential, and increasingly urgent. Modern defense systems depend on a narrow set of minerals and metals for their most essential components: rare earth permanent magnets in precision-guided munitions and fighter jet engines, titanium in aircraft airframes and naval vessels, cobalt in superalloys for jet turbines, gallium arsenide in radar and electronic warfare systems, beryllium in satellite structures and nuclear weapons components, and tungsten in armor-piercing projectiles. A disruption in the supply of any of these materials would impair the ability of a nation to manufacture, maintain, and deploy its most advanced military platforms.

Defense Manufacturing Dependencies

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) has repeatedly identified critical mineral supply chain vulnerabilities as a top-tier national security concern. A 2021 DoD report on supply chain resilience found that the U.S. defense industrial base depends on foreign sources for the majority of its critical mineral inputs, with China being the dominant or sole supplier for several categories. Rare earth elements are a particularly acute concern: the permanent magnets used in the guidance systems of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), the electric motors of the F-35 Lightning II, and the actuators in Virginia-class submarines all require neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium, metals for which China controls over 85% of global processing capacity.

Titanium presents another critical vulnerability. Russia's VSMPO-AVISMA has historically been one of the largest suppliers of aerospace-grade titanium sponge to Western defense contractors and commercial aircraft manufacturers, including Boeing and Airbus. Following the invasion of Ukraine, Western companies have worked to reduce their dependence on Russian titanium, sourcing instead from Japan (Toho Titanium), Kazakhstan, and the United States, but the transition has strained supply and increased costs. The defense implications extend beyond procurement: titanium is essential for the structural integrity of next-generation aircraft, and any sustained shortage would delay production schedules for military and commercial platforms alike.

Antimony, used as a hardening agent in lead alloys for ammunition, in flame retardants for military textiles, and in semiconductor compounds for infrared sensors, illustrates how even lower-profile minerals can have outsized defense relevance. China produces approximately 48% of the world's antimony and controls an even larger share of refined output. The U.S. Department of Defense has identified antimony as a material with no readily available domestic source and limited allied production, making it a high-priority target for supply chain diversification and strategic stockpiling.

Strategic Stockpiles and the National Defense Stockpile

Strategic mineral stockpiling is one of the oldest tools of national security resource management. The United States established the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) in 1939, originally to ensure access to raw materials during wartime. At its peak during the Cold War, the NDS held over $10 billion worth of strategic and critical materials, including titanium, cobalt, manganese, chromium, and rare earths. However, post-Cold War drawdowns dramatically reduced the stockpile's holdings, and by 2020 the NDS was valued at approximately $900 million, far below the levels many defense analysts consider adequate.

Renewed awareness of supply chain vulnerabilities has prompted calls to rebuild the NDS. The Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized $1 billion in acquisitions for the stockpile, targeting materials including rare earths, cobalt, titanium, tungsten, and antimony. The Defense Logistics Agency Strategic Materials (DLA Strategic Materials) manages the stockpile and is working to identify priority materials based on updated assessments of wartime demand scenarios and supply chain vulnerabilities.

Other nations maintain their own strategic reserves. Japan's JOGMEC manages stockpiles of rare earths, cobalt, nickel, chromium, manganese, tungsten, and other metals, reflecting the country's acute dependence on imported minerals. South Korea maintains strategic reserves managed by the Korea Resources Corporation (KORES). China has built substantial government and commercial stockpiles of critical minerals, the exact quantities of which are state secrets but are estimated to be sufficient to sustain domestic industry for months in the event of a supply disruption. The EU, historically lacking a coordinated stockpiling mechanism, began exploring a strategic reserve system under the Critical Raw Materials Act.

The China Contingency

The most severe national security scenario involving critical minerals is a potential conflict over Taiwan. A Chinese military action against Taiwan, or even a prolonged blockade, would likely trigger sweeping Chinese export restrictions on critical minerals to countries opposing Beijing's actions. Given China's dominance in mineral processing, such restrictions could halt the supply of rare earth magnets, lithium chemicals, cobalt sulfate, gallium, germanium, and processed graphite to the United States, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and other nations.

Wargaming exercises conducted by U.S. think tanks, including the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the RAND Corporation, have modeled the impact of a Chinese mineral embargo in a Taiwan contingency. The analyses suggest that within weeks, production of precision-guided munitions would be constrained by rare earth magnet shortages, electric vehicle manufacturing would be severely disrupted by lithium and graphite supply cuts, and the semiconductor industry would face gallium and germanium shortfalls. These findings have accelerated efforts to build processing capacity outside China, secure allied supply commitments, and expand strategic stockpiles to provide a buffer during a conflict-induced supply disruption.

The Defense Production Act and Mineral Security

The U.S. Defense Production Act (DPA), originally enacted in 1950, gives the President broad authority to direct private industry to prioritize defense-related production, provide financial incentives for domestic manufacturing, and control the distribution of critical materials. In recent years, the DPA has been increasingly invoked for critical mineral projects. In 2022, President Biden used DPA Title III authorities to fund feasibility studies and early-stage development for domestic production of lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and manganese. In 2023, DPA funding was allocated to support rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing projects.

The DPA's effectiveness for mineral security is limited by the long lead times required to bring new mining and processing operations online. DPA funding can accelerate project timelines by providing grants, loans, and purchase commitments, but it cannot compress the geological, environmental, and regulatory processes that typically require a decade or more. The DoD has also used DPA authorities to support allied-nation projects, reflecting the recognition that national security mineral needs cannot be met through domestic production alone and that allied partnerships are essential to building resilient supply chains.

Intelligence and Supply Chain Monitoring

National security agencies are increasingly focused on monitoring critical mineral supply chains for threats, including foreign adversary investment in strategic mineral assets, covert stockpile manipulation, and cyberattacks on mining and processing infrastructure. The U.S. Intelligence Community has identified critical mineral supply chain monitoring as a priority intelligence requirement, and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has blocked or imposed conditions on several acquisitions of U.S. and allied mineral assets by Chinese-linked entities.

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) adds another dimension to supply chain scrutiny, creating a rebuttable presumption that goods produced in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are made with forced labor and are therefore barred from U.S. imports. Several critical mineral processing facilities are located in Xinjiang, including polysilicon plants for solar panels and some rare earth processing operations, requiring companies to demonstrate that their supply chains are free of forced labor to maintain market access.

Building Strategic Autonomy

Ultimately, the national security implications of critical mineral dependencies are driving a fundamental reassessment of how nations approach industrial policy. The post-Cold War consensus that markets would efficiently allocate resources and that interdependence would promote peace is being replaced by a recognition that strategic minerals are too important to be left entirely to market forces. National security now demands deliberate investment in domestic and allied mining and processing capacity, robust stockpiles calibrated to wartime scenarios, accelerated development of substitute materials and recycling technologies, and intelligence capabilities to monitor and respond to supply chain threats.

The challenge is immense: replicating decades of Chinese industrial investment in mineral processing, building the workforce and technical expertise to operate advanced chemical and metallurgical facilities, and doing so at a speed commensurate with the pace of geopolitical risk. But the cost of inaction, a defense industrial base dependent on a strategic competitor for its most essential inputs, is a vulnerability that no serious national security strategy can afford to ignore.